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Abstract:  
Entrepreneurship is often promoted as a universal solution for economic development issues. 
However, in practice different forms of entrepreneurship emerge in different countries. Some 
types, for example the Schumpertian ideal associated with innovation, do stimulate growth, 
but other types are much likely to do so. In this paper we argue that the national conditions for 
entrepreneurship, the Northian institutions, shape the form of enterprise. We employ 
international panel data to compare the effect of institutional factors on self employment, and 
patents. We find that the prevailing institutions are related to the form of entrepreneurship that 
emerges. 
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1. Introduction 
Entrepreneurship is nowadays generally recognised to be an engine of economic development 
(Miniti and Levesque, 2008). Entrepreneurs are the micro economic agents who link national 
institutions to economic outcomes at the macro level (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). Yet we 
are very aware that in some countries entrepreneurship flourishes and in others much less so 
(Acs, 2006; Audretsch and Thurik, 2000). As Verheul et al (2002) point out, entrepreneurship 
scholars appear to agree that the level of entrepreneurial activity varies across both countries 
and over time (Rees and Shah, 1986;  Blanchflower, 2000). Nonetheless there is no reason to 
suppose that the extent of individual entrepreneurial potential should vary by country. 
Entrepreneurship is argued to be the set of practices involving the creation or discovery of 
opportunities and their enactment (Gartner, 1988). As a human endeavour, we might expect it 
to be spread fairly evenly across the globe.  Indeed, in less developed countries it might even 
be anticipated that there are more opportunities (Smallbone and Welter, 2006). Yet, in terms 
of economic development outcomes, there are considerable international differences in 
entrepreneurship. It seems then, to explain these differences, we need seek an explanation at 
the national level, rather than at the level of the individual. If conditions for entrepreneurship 
vary, those conditions which foster enterprise, this might help explain why entrepreneurial 
processes produce different outcomes. It may also help explain the variety in entrepreneurship 
itself. Thus the objective of this paper is to explore these differing conditions for enterprise, 
the national “institutions” that appear to shape entrepreneurial outcomes.  
 
We begin by examining the concept of entrepreneurship and how, as an individual practice, it 
might be influenced by national conditions. Thus we try to develop some insight into how 
national institutions may influence enterprise. Arguing that institutions condition the outcome 
of the enterprise, we empirically explore the impact of different institutional compounds on 
the two extreme forms of entrepreneurship: self-employment ant patent grants with the 
objective of establishing the relationship between institutional factors and enterprise. In these 
approaches, we hope to address the questions of, if and how, national institutions shape 
entrepreneurship. 
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2 .  Entrepreneurship: some perspectives  
Entrepreneurship is a multidimensional concept (Verheul et al, 2002). At a macro level, 
“entrepreneurship” can be conceptualised as the sum of individual decisions made by 
entrepreneurs about investing in ventures. Consequently, one perspective is to consider the 
entrepreneur as individuals and then to aggregate their activities (Davidsson, 1995). In his 
seminal book, McClelland (1961) argued that the extent of individual psychological traits 
determined the level of entrepreneurship in a country. McClelland’s thesis about the “need for 
achievement” as a primary entrepreneurial trait has been expanded to include others such as; a 
risk taker, a good organizer and coordinator, with good intuition and leadership 
characteristics. In essence McClelland sees the aggregate of entrepreneurial traits as 
determining entrepreneurial outcomes and, in turn, economic growth. 
 
However, this psychological and individualistic perspective has been criticised (Anderson and 
Starnawska, 2009) as much too narrow  ( Drakopoulou Dodd and Anderson, 2007). As Knight 
(1985) proposes, “we cannot assess the rationality of individual action without taking account 
of the institutional and cultural context in which everyday decisions are made.”  One 
challenge is that entrepreneurs act within society and that their entrepreneurial process is 
shaped by that society (Anderson, 2003; Anderson and Smith, 2007). A second and even 
stronger challenge is that although entrepreneurs are agents of change, we cannot discount 
structure in a more complete explanation. As Gagliardi (2008) argues, in all the actions we 
pursue as economic agents, we are affected by institutions. Thus structure and agents operate 
in a dynamic relationship (Jack and Anderson, 2002). Accordingly the structure, as 
represented by institutions, will influence and may help explain entrepreneurial differences. 
Valliant and Lafuente (2007) thus suggest that a theoretical framework based on a socio-
cultural approach may be more appropriate for the study of entrepreneurship and SMEs than 
conventional economic and psychological approaches (Granovetter 1985, North 1990). The 
underlying assumption in this approach is that the decision to create a new enterprise, and 
therefore to become an entrepreneur, is conditioned by external or environmental factors. In 
other words, the socio-cultural factors of the institutional framework determine the levels of 
entrepreneurial activity in a specific time and place. Valliant and Lafuente (2007) argue that 
using an institutional approach helps explain radically different performance of economies 
over long periods of time. Zafirovski and Levine (1999) describe this socio-economic 
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approach as the sociological categories of economic action, so that economic variables are 
observations of complex social phenomenon. 
 
A more conventional economic conceptualisation of entrepreneurship is the Kirznerian 
approach; here, entrepreneurship is a process of detecting opportunities. Kirzner’s (1973) 
entrepreneur is a person who places new profit opportunities in the market place. Profit, or 
entrepreneurial rent as Kirzner puts it, accrues until market conditions eliminate the surplus 
entrepreneurial rent in opportunities. But as Miniti and Levansque (2008) point out, Austrian 
economics views entrepreneurship as a universal characteristic of human action. Although 
useful for seeing the function of entrepreneurship, it tells us little about why entrepreneurship 
levels should vary so much. Remaining with economic conceptualisations, Schumpeter 
(1934), characterised “entrepreneurship”, as the engine of an economy. For him, it was 
ongoing entrepreneurial innovations that injected new energy into an economy for its growing 
and flowering1
 
. For Schumpeter then, the entrepreneur’s role is to reallocate resources by 
breaking up the existed equilibriums through injecting entrepreneurial innovations. This 
Schumpeter vividly describes as the creative destruction process. Again we can see the 
function of the entrepreneur in this economic conceptualisation, but again we have no account 
of why it should vary so much. 
However, other economists do provide some theoretical purchase. Baumol (1996) notes that 
although there are some variations in entrepreneurial supply across countries, the biggest 
difference lies in the contribution of entrepreneurship to productive or unproductive 
outcomes. Baumol, noting the utility of Schumpeter’s thesis, argues that “entrepreneurs are 
always with us” (1996:3) but that they do not have an automatic bias towards innovation. 
Indeed, “at times the entrepreneur may even lead a parasitical existence that is actually 
damaging to the economy. How the entrepreneur acts at a given time and place depends 
heavily on the rules of the game- the reward structure in the economy- that happen to 
prevail.” Thus Baumol guides us to explore these “rules of the game”; that is to say, the 
institutions for enterprise. 
 
                                                 
1 Entrepreneurial innovations, consist of five cases: (1) The introduction of a new good; (2) The introduction of a 
new method of production;(3) The opening of a new market;(4) The conquest of a new source of supply of raw 
materials or part-manufactured goods; (5) The carrying out of the new organization of any industry  
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Baumol argues then that if the appropriate conditions exist, they will produce wealth 
otherwise they will not produce wealth and their activities could be derailed into unproductive 
and even destructive forms. The gist of Baumol’s thesis is that entrepreneurship can be 
expressed in a variety of forms, some of which could be quite bad from a public point of 
view. Society and the invisible hand (Smith, 1776) can provide resources and incentives to 
promote entrepreneurial activities, but if inappropriate conditions prevail, then 
"entrepreneurs" will utilise these resources for personal gain at the cost of economic growth.  
 
Baumol (1990) thus argues that entrepreneurial individuals channel their efforts according to 
the quality of prevailing economic, political, and legal institutions. Accordingly, this 
institutional structure determines whether entrepreneurial efforts are channelled to productive 
or unproductive outcomes.  Sobel (2008) claims that productive entrepreneurship is the 
fundamental source of economic growth and wealth creation. Where institutions provide 
secure property rights, a fair judicial system, contract enforcement and effective constitutional 
limits (Sobel, 2008), this reduces the profitability of unproductive entrepreneurship, so that 
individuals are more likely to engage in new wealth creation.  Baumol believes that the 
magnitude of the benefit the economy derives from its entrepreneurship potential depends 
substantively on allocation of their talents between productive and unproductive activities. 
Thus, the decision to “entreprendre” in this approach is influenced by the rate of return or 
profit rate of alternative activities, which themselves are determined by the quality of political 
and legal institutions. Good institutions draw entrepreneurial efforts towards productive 
activities while maintaining higher rates of economic growth. Minniti and Levansque (2008) 
explain that the new institutional economics follow the demarcation between institutions and 
organizations first noted by North (1990). Like Baumol, Minniti and Levansque argue that, 
since entrepreneurs are present in all settings, it is the different institutional structures which 
generate the large variances in standards of living across societies.  
 
A more recent distinction between types of entrepreneurship, nuancing Baumol’s constructive 
and destructive is the distinction between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship. 
Criticised by Smallbone and Welter (2006) as overly simplistic, the distinction, nonetheless 
highlights differences between the types of entrepreneurship likely to be found in less 
developed countries. The GEM studies (General Entrepreneurship Monitor) employs these 
categories to explain why the level of entrepreneurship in developing countries is sometimes 
higher than in developed countries. Necessity entrepreneurship is related to the absence of 
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employment options, whereas “opportunity entrepreneurship” denotes an active choice to start 
a new enterprise based on the opportunity and employing innovation. Reynolds and al (2001) 
argue that necessity entrepreneurship is related to poverty and does not create wealth. In 
contrast, opportunity entrepreneurship is associated with a long term economic growth. Acs 
(2006) takes this further and proposes that the distinction between opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurship is an indicator of economic development.  
 
It thus becomes clear that entrepreneurship is not the same across countries, it may be “good” 
or “bad” depending on the context where it is drawn from. Clearly, a driver of individual 
choice is “the institutions”. These institutions are thought to provide the framework which 
guides activity, removes uncertainty and makes the actions of others predictable. In short, 
institutions serve to reduce the costs of action and facilitate the coordination of knowledge 
dispersed throughout society. Correspondingly, entrepreneurial value creation, as the result of 
entrepreneurial actions, is the outcome of complex interactions between individual 
characteristics and institutional environment. Accordingly, promoting entrepreneurship thus 
implies establishing “good” institutions.  In effect it is the institutions that govern the 
performance of an economy (Coase, 1998). We turn now to examine the concept of 
“institutions”.  
 
3. Institutions 
 
Tran et al (2009) explain how institutional economics emphasises the effects of institutions on 
economic growth through providing information, more secure property rights and stringent 
enforcement mechanisms to stimulate cooperation. Empirical investigations using cross-
country-data have shown that better institutions are accompanied by higher economic 
performance. Economists have modelled institutions in two different ways: either as 
exogenously (North 1990) or as endogenously (Aoki 2001; Greif 1993, 1994). Aoki’s 
comparative institutional analysis conceptualises institutions as a self -enforcing equilibrium 
in an evolutionary repeated game. Contrastingly, North (1990) defines institutions as the rules 
(formal and informal) of the game. North’s approach therefore implies that enforcement relies 
(often implicitly) on the role of a third party. As we are not interested (at least in this work) 
either with the enforceability problem nor with the existence and the characteristics of 
equilibrium in such a game, we employ the North exogenous definition of institutions which 
also appears to be close to a common sense interpretation. Thus, for this paper, institutions are 
 7 
considered as a set of rules, conventions and norms that set a standard of behaviour for the 
members of a society. As Gagliardi (2008:421) puts it, “institutions determine the structure 
for exchange that influences transaction and transformation costs, hence the feasibility and 
profitability of engaging in economic activity. It is through this mechanism that institutions 
are the underlying determinant of long-run economic performance.” They continue, stated 
differently, institutions have the role of structuring human interaction in a stable, although not 
always efficient, way and this objective is accomplished by reducing the uncertainty that 
pervades all societies. 
 
 
3.1. Institutional components  
3.1.1. Formal institutions 
 
Of the elements comprising the formal institutions, property right protection regimes, rules of 
law, political and economic freedoms and corruption are the most cited constituents. 
However, a substantial literature (see e.g. McMillan and Woodruff (1999, 2002), Djankov et 
al; 2004) argues that weak institutions, notably the quality of the commercial code, the 
strength of legal enforcement, administrative barriers, extra-legal payments and lack of 
market-supporting institutions, represent a significant barrier to entrepreneurship  
 
3.1.2. Informal institutions 
Informal institutions are the implicit codified attitudes embedded in a society and work to 
provide cues for shaping individual behaviour. As a result, these informal institutions state 
entrepreneurial opportunities by deciding what behaviour is to be tolerated and thus 
legitimised as entrepreneurship in a society (Etzioni, 1987). In this vein, Anderson and Smith 
(2007) found that the narratives and discourses of the meanings of entrepreneurship are 
ideological and clearly present a moral space. They conclude that legitimate entrepreneurship 
resonates with a socially approved moral dimension. Jack and Anderson (2002) suggest that 
entrepreneurship should be conceptualised as an embedded socio-economic process. 
Embedding enables and shapes how entrepreneurs  recognise and realise opportunities in the 
environment. Thus, creating and operating enterprises should be congruent with socially-
approved behaviour manifest and coded in informal institutions.  
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3.2. Persistence versus Change of Institutions  
In spite of their inertia, resistance to change (Hoffman, 1999), persistence (Parto, 2005) and 
durability (Hodgson, 2003), institutions are subject to change. The functionalist view of 
institutions proposes that institutions necessarily change in response to change in their 
environment2
 
. These explanations are based on the assumption (mostly associated with the 
Chicago school) that economic agents can bargain to create adequate institutions. Institutions 
are thus seen as the result of some kind of Coasian bargain within society (see Acemoglu 
2001 for a contrary view). Therefore, institutions should in general be both efficient and 
adapted to the existing social and economic environment.  
However, since the 1970’s, Olson (1972) challenged the idea of institutions resulting from an 
efficient Coasian bargain. Olson (1972) emphasised the problems associated with the 
collective action of large groups. Obviously, this Olsonian analysis contrasts with the Chicago 
view; inefficient institutions may survive for a long time because groups with an interest in 
institutional change might fail to get organised to solve their collective action problem. 
Furthermore, because institutional change implies transforming structural inequities, 
resistance by those with vested interests can be expected. Therefore, new rules and 
institutions often clash with their longer-established counterparts.  Ruling out previous elites 
(associated with inefficient institutions) is not an easy task and frequently involves the need to 
balance the different interests of powerful actors. According to Bush (1987, 1989, 1994), the 
process of institutional adjustment can be broken down into two phases. Phase I involves 
ceremonial encapsulation, and Phase II involves regressive or progressive changes. In the 
entrepreneurship context, a progressive institutional change is related to an institutional 
adjustment where ceremonial behaviours that discouraged entrepreneurship are replaced by 
judgments that encourage entrepreneurship (Choy 2005; Bush 1987; 1989).  
Turning from theory to real experiences; China presents an example of successful institutional 
change3
                                                 
2 This is rather like the social scientific equivalent of the Lamarckian view that organisms evolve in order to 
adapt to changes in their environment (as opposed to the Darwinian view that genetic mutations are random and 
. From a Maoist era where entrepreneurship was a taboo to the recent years where 
that, when the environment changes, the mechanism of natural selection promotes the survival of the fittest). 
Interestingly Coase (1998) notes that Darwin arrived at his theory after reading Adam Smith on the division of 
labour. 
3 Chinese Communist Party leaders have publicly acknowledged the benefit that entrepreneurs  bring to the 
economy, Anderson et al (2003) and changes instutions. A recent survey conducted among Chinese found that 
70 percent of the respondents thought entrepreneurship was a good career choice (Gangemi 2007). Indeed, in 
2005,China had 24 million small independent companies and the number was growing at 15-20% annually 
(Loyalka and Dammon 2006). 
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China earned a reputation as one of the world’s most entrepreneur-friendly country, a clear 
change has been made. In the other extreme, most African countries failed drastically in their 
experiences of institutional change. The following (diagram 1) summarizes our theoretical 
argument: 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1. Data 
 
We collected data from two sources (see Table 1) so our sample data describes the relevant 
characteristics of 36 countries (Table 2) over 12 years (from 1995 to 2006). Data in this 
format is well suited to analysis using panel data techniques. Such techniques can encompass 
a large range of methods depending on (i) the assumptions that can be made on the structure 
of the general model and (ii) on the nature of the considered variables. Thus depending on the 
dependent variable that we choose to capture entrepreneurship, as well as the assumptions we 
postulate on the basic structure of the model, we use the most appropriate panel data 
technique. We explain our assumptions and argument in the analysis. 
 
4.2. Dependant  variable 
 
As discussed earlier, entrepreneurship has a multiple facets, and in reality a country has some 
level of both necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship. Nonetheless we expect a tendency 
to dominate so that one entrepreneurial form will characterise a country.  Let us consider as a 
benchmark, and also for the sake of simplicity, the two extreme approaches: self-employment 
and patent grants (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). We appreciate that self-employment may 
become opportunity entrepreneurship and that innovations may be created by the self-
employed, who hitherto were engaged in job replacement. However, our aim is simply to 
verify if these two a priori extreme views are determined by the same conditions, or are they 
ruled differently. Thus-  
• To analyse entrepreneurship as “owning a business” (Knightian sense), we use the self 
employment rate4
• To capture the innovative aspect of entrepreneurship we consider patent grants by 
country of origin (US patent office) 1995-2007. The choice of US patent grants is 
dictated by the fact that US has a “first to invent” system, all the other countries have a 
.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
4 OECD Factbook 2008: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics - 
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“first to file” system. This option is guided by our research objective; to capture the 
extreme expressions of entrepreneurship. 
 
 
4.3. Independent variables  
 
In the literature we presented the institutional context as both formal and the informal rules of 
the game, but here we deal only with formal institutions. The reason is straightforward, the 
availability of data. Since the five Hofstede cultural dimensions are cross sectional (Hofstede 
et al, 2004) and are not measured for the same year, it is methodologically infeasible to 
incorporate them into our panel data analysis. Given these constraints on data, we use several 
independent variables to reflect the institutional context.  These were derived from several 
different sources that are publicly available. These data bases offer variables related to rules 
of law, economic freedoms, political stability, and corruption. Nonetheless we had to decide 
which variables were most relevant and useful. If we considered all the available variables 
this would lead to a technical problem because a) the degree of freedom will be very reduced 
and b) because most of these variables are correlated.  We thus calculated the co-variances 
and selected those which are not correlated (correlation of less than 0.5). We are also 
cautiously assured that they vary across and within the considered sample. Finally, we 
integrated only five exogenous covariates. The variables definition, their sources and some 
descriptive statistics are indicated in table 1.2. 
 
4.4. The Econometric model 
 
Our aim is to estimate the relationship between entrepreneurship and the institutional context 
from different countries over different periods of time. This can be handled using methods 
developed in the context of panel data models (Greene 2003). One advantage is that panel 
data allows us to make many more observations. Moreover, the use of a panel data approach, 
rather than a pure cross section analysis or a time series analysis, is also justified by the 
possibility of controlling the individual and temporal heterogeneity of data. Furthermore a 
panel data approach allows the identification of effects that are not directly observable in a 
cross sectional, nor in a time series, approach.  
4.4.1. Self-employment 
The basic model for self-employment can be written as:   
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uY itiit5it4it3it2it10it GOVCPIINVTradeBus ++β+β+β+++= αβββ (1) 
 
Where Yit is the self employment rate in country i (i = 1, 2,…, N) at period t (t = 1, 2,…,T) ; 
αi are countries specific and are the unobserved individual effects or unobserved 
heterogeneity. Accordingly, αi are invariant over time, but are assumed to be different across 
countries; uit
   
 are called the idiosyncratic errors or idiosyncratic disturbances and they change 
across time. This error term is assumed to be homoskedastic and uncorrelated. 
4.4.2. Patent grants 
As “patent grants” is a count variable, and each subject has the same length of observation 
time, the appropriate model is the negative binomial regression model in the context of panel 
data. The negative binomial model, as compared to other count models (i.e., Poisson), is 
assumed to be the appropriate model. In other words, we assume that the dependent variable 
is ill-dispersed (either under- or over- dispersed) and does not have an excessive number of 
zeros. The basic model for  patent grants can be written as: 
!
it
y
eit
y
)
it
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λ−λ
==  
whereλ is the poisson parameter. iti uX'log +α+β=λ . Where X represents the vector of our 
exogenous variables. In the binomial case, an error term will be introduced in the mean : 
iti uX'log +α+ε+β=λ  
 
4.5. Empirical results 
  
The basic model in equation (1) was estimated using alternative regression methods. For the 
self-employment rate, the well known fixed effect and the random effect models are used in 
the standard way. The Hausman test was then run to determine which model should be 
adopted.   Since the p value of the Hausman test is, by far, less than 10%, either in the case of 
self-employment or patent grants (where the negative binomial regression in panel context is 
run), then the fixed effect model which focuses on the within country variation is 
econometrically more appropriate. However, fixed and random effects models give similar 
results for both patent grants and self employment rate regressions.  
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The regression results are presented in table (3).5
 
 
 4.5.1. Self-employment 
 
Our results show that business freedom, investment freedom and perceived corruption are the 
variables which significantly influence the self-employment rate. In contrast, trade freedom 
and freedom from government, do not significantly affect the self-employment rate.  
• Business freedom 
Business freedom has a negative impact on the self-employment rate; that is when the 
business freedom increases the self- employment rate decreases. Although this negative 
effect is not large (as the coefficient either in the fixed and the random case equals 
approximately to 0.3 ) it is somewhat surprising. Intuitively, we would have expected  
business freedom to be a “pull” factor. It may be that where there is a large degree of 
business freedom good job opportunities exist and thus people are not pushed into self 
employment. Alternatively, this result could be explained by the fact that less business 
freedom mirrors the existence of a centralised government where a tradition of  bureaucracy 
is deeply rooted. This kind of economic model is generally characterised by inefficiency and 
may led to a misallocation of resources. As a consequence these economies are characterised 
by high level of unemployment which induces individuals to have few other option but to 
become self-employment.  Baum et al (1993) also suggest that entrepreneurial individuals 
might encounter difficulties where business freedom is limited. Self employment may then 
become a means of achieving some independence in constrained circumstances..    
 
• Perceived corruption. 
 
Our findings implies that when the perceived corruption index increases, (which means that 
when business men and analysts perceive that the business becomes cleaner and more free 
from corruption), the self-employment rate decreases.  Again this seems counter intuitive, but  
one possible explanation is that the self-employed have developed the ability to deal with 
corruption on a daily basis. Moreover, the self-employed may not have the power to avoid 
                                                 
5 For the self-employment case, we also estimated the model using the feasible least square regression which 
gives estimators free from autocorrelation and heteroskedasticiy. The obtained results and the interpretations are 
almost similar than those obtained in the random / fixed effect models. These results are not reported here (but 
available upon request) because this procedure (feasible least square) does not exist for the negative binomial 
regression in a panel data context.   
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corruption and consequently may passively resign themselves to deal with it. Hofstede et al 
(2004) also note that countries with perceived high levels of corruption (and are relatively 
poor) have higher levels of self employment. They suggest that this is because, in these 
circumstances, people are drawn into self employment because they find themselves 
uncomfortable in existing structures and organisations. They also note that it may also be 
difficult to find a decent job. 
 
• Investment freedom 
 
When investment freedom, which is related to foreign investment policy, increases, the self-
employment rate increases too.  This result seems to be consistent with the literature about the 
developmental role of foreign direct investment that postulates that foreign investment 
exhibits spillover effects and promotes skills to locals. Another  possible explanation for our 
result is that when foreign investment prevails, it probably creates and/or increases local 
demand for specific goods and services. By responding to this demand, locals create their own 
enterprises, so that a myriad of small enterprises could develop.  
 
4.5.2. Innovative entrepreneurship (patent grants)  
 
As with the self-employment results, business freedom, and perceived corruption are the 
variables which significantly influence patent grants. However, the sign of this relation is 
different from the self-employment case.  In contrast, trade freedom, freedom from 
government and investment freedom do not significantly affect patent grants. 
 
• Business freedom 
 
Business freedom affects positively patent grants. In general, businesses seek to maximize 
their freedom to operate.  Furthermore, because innovation is a risky activity, an entrepreneur 
will seek an environment where starting, running and closing the business are processes 
without great administrative and legislative difficulties.  
 
• Perceived corruption 
 
The perceived corruption index is positively related to patented innovation; that is when the 
perceived corruption increases (i.e. the economy is seen as very clean) patented innovation 
increases too. This is as expected. Corruption is often associated with a high degree of 
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uncertainty which discourages investors especially when we consider that innovation is 
expensive, uncertain and a risky affair. Moreover, because in a corrupt environment bribes 
may be paid to government officials, innovative entrepreneurs will avoid corrupted economies 
mainly because they are worried about the protection of their innovation. Indeed, there is a 
high correlation between rules of law and corruption. So corrupted systems do not have rules 
of law that are able to guarantee that innovation will be properly protected.    
  
5. Conclusions 
 
Our empirical results regarding the self-employment rate are at first view, counter intuitive. 
However, on deeper examination they begin to make more sense and reflect other thoughtful 
work (Hofstede et al, 2004). The factors in institutions do not always seem to work in a 
straightforward way towards self employment. Nonetheless, our results about patent grants 
are more intuitive. Here we see that factors in institutions that we would assume to be 
positive, do indeed encourage innovation. Our work shows that these extreme manifestations 
of entrepreneurship appear to be determined by almost the same institutional factors; but these 
factors seem to be acting in opposite directions- what encourages self-employment, 
discourages innovation and vice-versa. 
 
Indeed, perceived corruption and business freedom have a negative effect on self-employment 
and positive effect on patent grants.   Of course corruption is more than nasty behaviour; the 
phenomenon that has attracted the interest of researchers in different fields of social sciences.  
An important literature has developed on this topic, with a dominant view implying that 
corruption harms economic activity (Gyimah-Brempong 2001; Ali and Isse 2003; Brunetti et 
al. 1998). However, several rationales have been developed to show that by “greasing the 
wheels of bureaucracy, corruption could be beneficial to the economy”. In this vein, Mauro 
(1995) found indecisive results relating to the effect of corruption on GDP.  Brown and al 
(2007) found that an increase in GDP per capita might result in an actual short-term increase 
in corruption, but over the long term this trend reverses. Our findings seem to add to this 
literature, by suggesting that corruption promotes self-employment (as necessity 
entrepreneurship) but discourages innovation (as opportunity entrepreneurship). This also 
implies that this necessity entrepreneurship seems to induce some level of necessity 
corruption. 
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It is well recognized that economic freedom compounds are associated with growth. 
However, our results show that self-employment is negatively correlated with both business 
freedom and perceived corruption. This implies that self-employment is negatively correlated 
with growth. Consequently, our results support the suggested opposition between self-
employment as not creating long term growth and innovative entrepreneurship as generating 
long term prosperity.  
 
Since Adam Smith (1776), economic theory emphasises the necessity of protecting the 
freedom of individuals because this results in greater prosperity for the whole of society. 
Consequently, some authors argue that countries with high levels of economic freedom will 
be more entrepreneurial. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that liberalisation policies could 
be very appropriate when the considered economy has the required innovation infrastructure 
to assure the passage from necessity to opportunity entrepreneurship; otherwise 
liberalisation’s outcome will be unemployment rather than prosperity. 
 
As any study, this paper has several limitations: while the empirical results are 
interesting, caution should be exerted when generalizing the findings. Indeed, despite the fact 
that the panel data context gives a large degree of freedom, the countries considered on the 
sample employed are, by far, developed countries. Of course this situation was not a choice 
but it was dictated by data availability.  Nonetheless, we believe that our study makes a sound 
empirical contribution in that it gets “off the theoretical veranda” of economic theorising and 
uses data.  
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
. 
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Annexe 
 
 Diagram 1, Conceptual framework 
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The country list: 
 
Australia ,Austria,  Belgium ,Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark ,Finnland , France,Germany, 
Greece Hungary, Iceland , Ireland , Italy , Japan , Luxembourg , Mexico ,Netherlands 
,New Zealand ,Norway, Poland ,Portugal , Slovak Republic, Spain , Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Brazil, Chile, China, Estonia, Israel, 
Russian Federation, Slovenia  
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Annexe 
 
Table 1: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics (N = 432) 
Variable and its  
and acronym 
Variable definition  
 
Source 
Descriptive statistics 
 Min Max Mean SD 
       
 
Business freedom 
Bus                                                                                                
 
Ten elements equally weighted are used to 
calculate the “business freedom score”, 
these elements are related to procedures to 
start, run and close a business. The score 
ranges from 0 to 100, where 100 represent 
the maximum degree of business freedom 
 
 
Heritage 
foundation      
 
 
  
30 
 
97,96 
 
95,77 
 
15,96 
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Trade freedom 
Trade  
 
This score is based on tow elements: The 
trade-weighted average tariff rate and 
Non-tariff barriers. It ranges between 0 
and 100, where 100 represents the 
maximum degree of trade freedom. 
 
 
  
Heritage 
foundation  
 
40 
 
100 
 
73,65 
 
8,98 
Investment freedom 
INV 
This factor scrutinizes each country’s 
policies toward foreign investment, as 
well as its policies toward capital flows 
internally, in order to determine its overall 
investment climate. The country’s 
investment freedom ranges between 0 and 
100, where 100 represents the maximum 
degree of investment freedom 
 
 
Heritage 
foundation  
  
 
30 
 
 
90 
 
 
67,58 
 
 
13,88 
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Corruption 
perception index 
CPI 
 
The CPI Score relates to perceptions of 
the degree of corruption as seen by 
business people, risk analysts and the 
general public and ranges between 10 
(highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
 
 
 
 
Transparency 
International    
 
 
2,1 
 
 
10 
 
 
6,733 
 
 
2,18 
 
 
 
Freedom  
from Government 
Gov  
Scoring of the freedom from government 
factor is based on two components (i) 
Government expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP (ii) Revenues generated by state-
owned enterprises and property as a 
percentage of total government revenue. 
The country’s freedom from government 
ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 
represents the maximum degree of 
freedom from government. 
 
 
 
Heritage 
foundation 
 
 
3,9 
 
 
95,09 
 
 
52,91 
 
 
18,10 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 
 Business Trade Inv  Cpi 
Bus  1    
Trade  0,3571 1   
Inv  0,2987 0,4683 1  
Cpi 0,4959 0,3409 0,4647 1 
Gov  -0,0525 -0,0859 -0,2137 -0,3133 
 
 
 31 
Table 3 
 
 
       Self-employment Results                                      Patent Grants Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled: chibar 2(01) =  1262.26 , Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
(*) (**), (***) indicate parameter significance at the (13), (5), (1) per cent level respectively 
 
 
 
variables Fixed effect Random 
effect 
Bus  -0.032 ***   -0.033** *  
Trade  -0.01    -0.012 
Inv  0.04   *** 0.039*** 
Cpi -0.29  *  0.486**    
Gov  -0.0039   0.0018 
Cte 20,1*** 21.68*** 
observation 380 380 
R-squared 0,13 0.2359                                         
R-squared 
within 
0,12 0.1177                          
R-squared 
between 
0,15 0.2670                                         
Hausman test, 
Prob>Chi2 
 45,17*** 
 
variables Fixed effect Random 
effect 
Bus  0.003**  0.00325 **   
Trade  0.002   0.001    
Inv  -0.0008 -.0009496    
Cpi 0.081** .09322  *** 
Gov  -0.0017  -0.00174    
Cte 1.544687    1.542439 ***   
observation 386 386 
  
Log loklihood 
-2020.8723 
***                    
-2382.815  ***                   
Hausman test,  
 
Prob>Chi2 
 116.27*** 
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